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Introductory Statement. 
It is not our purpose in this thesis to attempt a com­
plete and detailed history of equity as it exists in England 
and in the United states. To do this would involve little 
more than a compilation of what has already been quite elab­
orately treated by some of the great legal minds of England 
and America. 
We -propose to treat rather of the nature of Equity as 
it existed in the Roman Law. its influence in the ~nglish 
law, the primitive condition of the law at the time of the 
origin of Equity, and of the causes which made courts of 
Equity necessary. Our treatment of the subject is therefore 
analytical rather than historical. 
Some general account, however, of the origin of Equit­
able Jurisdiction, of the sources from which the principles 
and doctrines of the Equity jurisprudence took their rise, 
and of the causes which led to the establishment of the 
court of chancery with its methods of procedure separate and 
distinct from the common law tribunal, with their rigid forms 
of action is essential to an accurate conception of the 
nature and true function of Equity as it exists at the pres­
ent day. 
We shall the ?efore preface our work with a brief hist­
orical sketch exhibiting the system in its beginnings and 
descriptive of the early movements of that progress through 
which its principles have been developed into a great 
body of doctrinal rules which constitute an important 
department of the municipal law. 
--- -
The growth of Equity as a part of English law was 
anticipated by a similar development of the same notions 
in Roman Jurisprudence. In point of fact, Equity as admin­
istered by the early English Chancellors, and the jurisdict­
ion of their court were directly borrowed from the Ae~ui~~s 
and judicial powers of the Roman magistrates; the one cannot 
be fully understood without some knowl~dge of the other. 
This intimate connection between the ,two systems is a suff­
icient reason for the following brief statement of the mode 
in which Aequitas was introduced into the Roman law, and of 
the important part which it per~ormed under the great jurists 
and magistrates of the Empire in shaping the doctrines of 
that system of jurispruaence. 
The researchersof modern juridical scholars have ex­
posed the falsity of much that has been written by English 
authors such as C~ke and Blackstone with respect to the orig­
in of this law and have demonstrated the existence of the 
closest relations between the Roman jurisprudence and the 
early English common law. S.'hese rel~tions with the grOWing 
Common law were disturbed, and finally broken, from politic­
al motives and considerations; but with the Equity juris­
prudence they became, for that very reason, even more intim­
ate and have so continued until the present day. 
In the earliest period of l{Oman law of which there is 
any remaining trace, . and for a considerable time after the 
epoch of legisl~tion known as the twelve tables, there ~ ere 
five actions (legis actiones) for the enforcement of all 
civil rights. Nothing could ~xceed the srbitrarin~ss and 
formalism of these legal proceedings. bbsolute accuracy 
was required in complying with the established ohras€s and 
acts; any o~1ission or mistake of a word or a movement was 
fatal~ Gaius who wrote long after they were abolished. says 
of them: "But all of these actions of th~ law fell gradually 
into great discredit, because the over-subtlEty of the 
ancient jurists made the slightest error fatal." These act­
ions finally became o~solete and disappeared, except one of 
them, which under a modified form was retained for certain 
very special cases until a late period of the Empire. 'l'he 
analogy between them and the old "rreal actions rf of the ~ng-
lish law is striking and complete. Their place in all ord­
inary controversies, was supplied by a species of judicial 
proceedings much more simple and natural to Which the gen­
eric name fo rmula was, given. 
These formulas were the regular steps or processes in 
a cause prior to the trial, reduced to writing, but always 
carefully governed by strict rules and conducted in conform­
ity with prescribed forms. The par t ies appeared before the 
magistrate and the formllla was prepared by him, or under 
his direction. It contained what we would ca.ll the IlPlesd­
\ings", namely a statement of the plaintiff's cause of actioni' 
besring different nsmes in different actions. expressed in 
technical language which vbried according to the action and 
the defense; it also contained the appointment of the lay 
person who was t o t ry t he issue and render judgment, the 
judex, or the arbiter; the rule of law which was to govern 
him, not stated, as an abstraot proposition. but simply as 
a direction, in short and technical terms, to render such a 
judgment if the plaintiff proved 'the case stated in the plead­
ing, other wise to dismiss the suit. This entire formula 
was contained in a few brief sentences and the technical 
words or phrases used indicated clearly the nature of the 
action. ~he relief to be given, the defenses to be admitted 
and the legal rule to be followed. The contrast between 
its brevity. s implicity and at the same time comprehensi ve­
ness, and the repetitions, redundancy and obscurity of the 
later Common Law special pleadings is very striking. The 
formulas being thus prepared before the magistrate (the 
cause being at that stage tfin .iure") the partIes then went 
Defore the "judex," or "arbiter" and proceeded With the trial 
the cause being at that time "in judicio." He hear d the 
testimony and the arguments of counsel, and rendered the 
judgment; but the oause was then taken before the magistrate 
a second time, whose power it was to enforce the judgment, 
and who also possessed revisory authority over the deciSion 
of the judex. It is plain that the duties and functions of 
the jud ex corresponded closely with those of our jury; and 
even his power in rendering the judgment was not essentially 
different from that of the jury in giving their verdict, 
since the judgment itself, which ought to be rendered. was 
prescribed in the direction of the formula. and the jud.ex 
had no more authority than the jury has in determining the 
rule of law which should govern the rights of the parties. 
The funotions of the magistrates were more complex. 
The most important magistrates, after the development 
of the Roman law had fairly commehced, and down to the per­
iod under the Empire at which the administration was en­
tirely remodeled . were the Praetors, Urban and Peregrine, 
(Praetor ,- Ur~anU~ t Praetor Peregrinum). The praetor in the 
totality of his juridical functions. corresponded both to 
the English common law oourts and the Chancellor. As the 
English courts, by means of their legislative functions 
have built up the greater part of the law of England, so did 
the praetors, by the exercise of the same function, construct 
the largest part of the Roman jurisprudence, which was after­
. 
wards put into a scientific shape by the great jurists of 
the Empire. and was finally codified in the Pandects of Just­
inian. This legislative work of theirs was done in a manner 
and form so outwardly different f rom that of the Engl ish 
judges, that we have apoarently failed to observe the iden­
tity. This identity, however, exists and the differenoes 
are wholly formal. The legislative work of the Engl ish and 
American courts has been and still is done in the judgments 
and opinions rendered upon the deciSion of cases after the events 
have happened which called for such official utterances. 
The same work of the Roman praetors was done in the Edicts 
(Edicta) which they issued upon taking office, and which in 
the course of time became one continuous body of law, each 
magistrate taking what had been left by his predecessors, 
and altering, amending, or adding. as the needs of an advan­
cing civilization required. The form of this edict was pec­
uliar. Instead of laying down abstract propositions defin­
ing prim8ry rights and duties. or publishing formal commands 
similar to modern statutory enactments. the magistrates an­
nounced that under cettain specified circumstances, a remedy 
would be granted by means of a deSignated action. where the 
prior law gave no such remedy; or that under certain circum­
stances. if a person attempted to enforce a rule of the 
prior law by action. a defense Which had not existed before 
would be admitted and sustained. 
The jurisdiction of the praetors Which was exercised by 
means of the formulas, and in which s, judex or other lay 
person was called in to deci de the issues of fact was called 
his "ordinary" jurisdiction. In the later periods of the 
Republic, there came into being another jurisdiction termed 
the "Extraordinary" jurisdiction. In causes coming under 
this jurisdiction, the magistrate himself deoided both the 
law and fact. without the intervention of any judex. and un­
hampered by any technical reqUirements as to the kind of 
formula or proper form of action. The plElintiff alleged 
the fa.cts making out his ca.use of action; the defendant set 
forth his defense; and the magistrate decided. By this 
method remedies could be given which w~re not provided for 
in any existing form of action, and equitable notions eould 
therefore be applied more freely. and thus incorporated into 
the rapidly growing mass of the national jurisprudence. In 
this "extraordinary" jurisdiction we can pl.sinly see the 
prototype of English chancery proceedure, while the ordinary 
methods by formulas Were certainly the analognes of the com­
mon Law forms of action. 
The "extraordinary" jurisdiction continued for a long 
time side by side with the ordinary, growing in extent and 
importance until it became the only mode in common use. By 
a constitution of the Emperor Diocletian CA. D. 294), all 
causes in the province were required to be tried in this 
manner; and finally the same rule was made universal thru­
out the Empire. Here, again, we may see another of the rep­
etitions which history exhibits under the operation of like 
social forces. This important event in Roman Jurisprudence 
was in all its essential elements similar to the legislation 
of Great Britain, and of the American States, by which Elll 
.distinction between suits in Equity and actions Elt Law has 
been abolished, and the two jurisdictions h8ve been oombined 
in the same proceeding and conferred upon the same tribunal. 
As we have already stated, the legislative work of the 
praetors was accomplished by the introduction of new actions, 
whereby a right could be enforced. which the law pr i or to 
that time did not recognize. or which it perhaps absolutely 
denied. The number of particular actions thus invented or 
allowed by the praetorian law was large. ~nd they could have 
been separated in various classes. We propose to arrange 
them in' three groups. The early law of Rome which existed 
prior to the time when the praetorian development actually 
commenced, and the external form of which was preserved 
through a large p&rt of that development--the jus civile-­
was stern. rigid and arbitrary, paying little or no attent­
ion to abstract right, and justice, reflecting in great pert 
the characters and customs of primitive Rome. Certain pre­
scribed actions and defenses appropriate for certain facts 
and circumstances were admitted, but for other facts and 
circumstances differing from those to which the existing 
actions or defenses were exactly adopted. it f urni shed no 
remedy. In their work of building up a broader system of 
jurisprudence upon the Roman basis of this ancient jus civile. 
the praetors, in the first place introduced a new class of 
actions ,,-.:hich were substantially the same as thosl x,provided 
by the existing law. unaltered in any of their essential 
features. but larger in the scope of their operation. The 
old established actions of the jus civile were employed, 
therefore. without chEnging the technical words. phrases and 
parts of their formulae. but extended this application to 
new facts and circumstances. These new facts and circumst~n­
ces did not differ greatly from the subject matter to which 
the actions had been originally adapted by the former law; 
they necesst;rily came within the same general principle whi.ch 
had been the rule of decision before the scope of the actions 
was enlarged. Similarly. the English law courts have in 
later times used the ancient actions of covenant and debt. 
trespass. without altering their technical forms, for the 
decision of issues which had not arisen in the earlier per­
iods of the common law. The second of the thr~e groups or 
classes, contained a long-. r number of new actions first 
a ' lowed by the praetors. which though not substantially the 
aame, were analogous or similar in their nature and objects 
to those which existed in the ancient jus civile. The form­
ulas of these new actions bore a general resemblance to those 
of the old. and were indeed patterned after them, but still 
differed from them in various important p&rticulars. 
Necess&ry changes were made in the statement of the 
plaintiff's cause of action, of the defendant's defense, or 
of the direction of the judgment, addressed to the judex or 
arbiter. New cases were thus provided for; new rules of law 
were introduced; old ones were modified or repealed. The 
number of p~ rticul&r acti .ms embraced in this class was large, 
and in the course of the legal development from age to age, 
the praetors were enabled by their means to soften the rig­
ors of the old law. to remove its 5rbitrariness t End to mold 
its doctrines into a nearer conformity with the principles 
of right and justice. The actions comprised in thi~ class 
and the services which they rendered in improving the Rom­
an law were strictly analogous to the actions of ejectment. 
case, trover, and especially assumsit, and the work which 
they have performed in expounding and ameliorating the co~ 
, 
mon law. The third class consists of the new actions intro­
duced from time to time, which were quite different, both in 
principle and in form, from any that had existed under the 
old law. In their invention. the magistrate dissevered all 
connection with the ancient methods~ and by their use, more 
than by any other method, he constructed a jurisprudence 
founded upon and penetrated by equitable doctrines which fin­
ally supplanted the old jus civile, and became the Roman 
Law, as it was scientifically arranged by the great jursits 
of the Empire, and is known to us as the Pandects and In­
stitutes of Justinian. 
The material used in the work of improving the jus 
civile originated in what was termed the jus gentium, or law 
of nations. This law was found in those rules of conduct 
which the magistrates found existing alike in the legal sys­
tems of all the people with which Rome came in contact. 
These rules they conceived to have a certain universal Sbnc­
tion as founded upon fundamental principles of human nature. 
At a later day, the st'> i c law of morality whi(:h was 'termed 
legally. the lex naturae was invoked. It was found that the 
jus gentium and lex naturae were frequently identically the 
same in principle. Hence arose the conception that the nat­
ural law and the law of nations were one and the same; or 
that the doctrines which were found common to all national 
forms of government were dictated by and formed basic prin­
ciples of the natural law. 
The particular rules of Roman jurisprudence derived 
from this morality. or law of nature. were called NAequitae" 
from the word aequum. because they were deemed to be imp£r­
tial in their operation and therefore ap plicable to all 
people alike. The law of nature was conSidered to be the 
ruling force in gov0rnment and in all the machinery of govern­
ment, and therefore it was presumed to have absolute authority, 
To bring the entire juridical system into conformity with 
this all embracing morality. and to allow only those actions, 
to render those decisions which would be in st~i ct conformity 
with the moral. was the purpose of the Roman mQgistrates and 
jurists. Therefore, when to adhere to the form or substance 
of the primitive jus civile would do a moral wrong and pro­
duce an inequitable result, (inaequum) the praetor in seek­
ing conformity with the law of nature, provided a remedy by 
means of an appropriate action or defense. Gradually the cir­
cumstances under which the praetor would interfere grew more 
certain, so that a great bpdy of principles based upon the 
natural law was introduced into the Roman system of juris­
prudence, which constituted Equity. This body of law was 
not a separate department of the law; it permeated the en­
tire system, displacing what was harsh and unjust, and bring­
ing the whole into an accord with prevalent moral nations. 
Originally. aeGuitas conveyed the idea of universality, a 
regard for the interests of all whose interests were worthy 
of regard, in contrast strikingly with the maintainance of 
an exclusive or p£rtial regard for the interests of some. 
The latter had been the dominating ch~racteristic of the old 
jus civile. Following the introduction of Christianity. and 
after its influence had been felt through out the then known 
world. the meaning of aequitas became enlarged and was then 
made to include our modern conceptio~s of right, justice 
and morality. This point, however, is not within our pr~v-
Thus we determine that there are reany an&logies between 
the growth of Equity at Roman and English law. The same 
causes operated to make it a necessity; that the same methods 
were up to a certain point pursued to make possible, that in 
principle the same results were reached. These similarities 
in the two systems are striking. No less striking, however, 
are the differences. 
In the Roman system the magistrates ~ere willing to do 
what the early English common law judges refused to do, thbt 
is, to promote and control the entire legal development as 
the needs of an expanding empire demanded. Therefore no sep­
arate court or tribunal was necessary at Roman law. The Com­
mon Law judges on the contrary resisted any form of innovation 
upon their established procedure. By so doing they cramped 
the legal growth, whereas the Roman judges led the way in 
reform movements and were frequently in antiCipation of the 
needs of their growing communities. Whereas the Roman Prae­
tors effected their refo~~ by the exercise of their own 
jurisdiction, the English judges formed new tribunals. 
Like th~ t of all peoples in the early stages of their 
development, the law of England during the Anglo-Saxon and 
early Norman period was lsrgely the result of circumstance 
and founded principally ~pon the customs Which circumstance 
made prevalent. The very primitive Saxon Codes with the ex­
ception of a few excerpts from Holy Writ, and fewer frag­
ments of the then known remains of Roman law, were chiefly 
repetitions of prior existent customs which had come down 
through tradition. The Saxon folk courts and the Witana­
gemote were not composed of professional judges and gQided 
themselves in the deCision of particular controversies in 
the light of established customs which when stabilized had 
the same force and effect as our own positive law. 
William the C,:mqueror allowed the local folk courts of 
the Saxons to continue in existende. With the manor courts 
I 
of the Norman Barons, they formed the tribunals of first re­
sort for the settlement of ordinary disputes through several 
reigns after that of William the Conqueror. As the more 
strictly professional tribunals grew in importance, these 
courts gradually fell into disuse until the traveling just­
ices apPointed by the King's Court as representing the crown 
superseded them entirely. William, however, made some im­
portant innovations. In the Curia Regis (King's Court) 
which then, and for a considerable time afterwards, was a 
body cmmposed of Barons and high ecclesiastics with legis­
lative, j~dicial End administrative functions as yet unsep­
arated, he appointed a Chief Justiciary to preside over the 
hearing of suits. This creation of a permanent judicial 
officer was the germ of the professional common law tribunals 
having a supreme jurisdiction throughout England. which sub­
sequently became established as a p[ rt of the government, 
distinct from the legislative and the executive. As occ­
asion required, he also apPOinted itinerant justices to trav­
el about and hold "pleas" or preside over the shire courts 
in the different counties. These officers were temporary 
and they ceased to function as such when their special dut­
ies had been performed. The.v_were, however, the beginning 
of a judicial system Which still prevails in England, and 
which has been adopted in many of the American states. 
The organization made and allowed by William continued 
without any substantial change, but yet with gradual modif­
ications and necessary improvements through several succeed­
ing reigns. The business of the King's Court steadily in­
ores aed; under Henry 11 its judioial funotions were finally 
separated from the legislstive. and from that time on, until 
its abolition in 1874, it has continued to be the highest 
common law tribunal of original jurisdiction under the name 
of the Court of King' s Benoh. In the reign of Henry 1 t, i t­
inerant justioes were sometimes appointed as by William the 
Uonqueror. under Henry 11 their office and function ~ere 
made permanent; but during the reign of Edward Ill, their 
places were filled and their duties performed by the justices 
of the superior oourts, aoting under special oommissions 
empowering them to hold cOllrts of oyer and terminer. ' 
These itinerant justioes "jllstices in eyre" went 
from county to county holding pleas--civil and criminal, and 
as a consequence, the old local courts of the shire, hundred 
. 
and manor were abandonaoas means of determining controversies 
between litigant parties. The Kingls Court even after it 
became a purely judicial body. was attached to the person of 
the King, and fallowed him in his journeys and residences 
in different parts of the realm. The great inconvenience 
resul ting to suitors because of this transi,tory quality of 
the court Was remedied by the Magna Charta Which provided 
in one of its articles that "Common Pleas shall no longer 
follow the king. tI In obediencE , to this msndate of the Char­
ter, justices were appointed to hear controversies concern­
ing lands and other matters merely civil--known as "cornmon 
pleas" and the new tribunal composed of these judges was fix­
ed at Westminster. Thus commenced the Court of Common Bench. 
The third su-perior common law tribunal acquired its powers 
in a much more irregular manner. In the arrangement of his 
government, William the Conqueror had established a board of 
high officials to superintend and m~n&ge the royal revenues, 
and a number of barons, With the chief justiciary were re­
quired to attend the sittings of this board, in order to de­
cide the legal questions which might arise. These judicial 
assessors in the course of time became the Court of Excheq­
uer, a tribunal whose authority originally extended only to 
the decision of causes directly connected with the r~venuet 
but its jurisdiction was subsequently enl&rged, through the 
use of legal fictions, and thus n~ade to a certain extent, con­
curr:e~t with that of the two other superior law courts. The 
office of Chancellor was very ancl-ent. It had existed be­
fore the Conquest, and was continued by Vfilliam. Under his 
succe ~ sors . the Chancellor soon became the most important 
functionary of the king's government, the personal advisor 
and representative of the Crown, but in the earliest times, 
wi thout any real judicial pO':'i ers and duties annexed to the 
position. How these functions were acquired, it is our pur­
pose to describe. The three superior law courts whose orig­
in has just been traced, have remained wit b some statutory 
modifications through the succeeding centuries, until by the 
Judicature Act of 1873, they and the Court of Chancery, and 
certain other courts were abolished as distinct tribunals. 
• 

and were consolidated into one "supreme court of Judicature." 
The local folk courts left in existence at the conquest 
and even the itinerant justices and the central King's Court 
for a while continued to administer a law which was largely 
6 thing of custom. The progress of SOCiety. the increase in 
importance of pronerty rights, the artificial system which 
we call feudalism, with llts mass of arbitrary rules and 
usages. all demanded and ~apidly produced a more certain. 
complete and authoritative jurisprudence for the entire real~t 
than the existing popular customs, however ancient and wid e­
ly observed. This work of building up a positive jurisp~ud­
ence upon the foundations of the saxon customs and feudal 
usages, this initial activity in creating the Co~~on Law of 
England, was done not by parliamentary legisl~tion, nor by 
royal decree, but by the justices in their decisions of civ. 
11 and criminal causes. The law which had been chiefly cust­
omary and therefore unwr,itten, preserved only by tradition 
~ as changed in its f orm by being embodied in a series of 
judicial precedents preserved in the records of the courts, 
or 0ublished in the books of reports, and t~~sit became. so 
far as these precedents expressed its principles and rules. 
a written law. 
In this work of constructing a jurisprudence, the early 
common law judges as well as the Chancellor at a later day 
drew largely from their own knowledge of the Roman law. The 
Cownon Law of ~ngland in its earliest formative period, was 
muoh indebted to that Roman jurisprudence which ehters so 
largely into the judicial systems of all the western nations 
of the European continent. Besides the proof furnished by 
the law itself. several important facts connected with the 
external history of its primitive stages point to this con­
clusion. The clergy who possessed most of the learning of 
the times were students of the Roman law. The earliest just­
ices of. the common law courts, as well a s the chancellors 
were generally taken from the higher rank of ecclesiastics: 
and on all occasions where it was necessary for them to 
legislate in the decision of p&rticulLr cEses. to create new 
rules for rel~tions hitherto undetermined they naturally 
had recourse to the code with which they werE familiar. bor­
rowed many of its doctrines. and adopted them as grounds for 
their judgments. Nor was a knowledge of the Roman law con­
fined to the courts: its study became a part of what we now 
term--higher education. 
Had it not b· en for several very powerful causes, part­
ly g~owing out of the English national character. or rather 
out of the character of the Norman kings and barons who ruled 
over England, and pLrtly arising from external events connect­
ed with the government itself. it is probable that this work 
of assimilation and of building up the common law with mater­
ials taken from Roman legislation. would have continued 
throughout its entire formative period. As the corpus juris 
civilis c6ntains the results of the labors of the great phil­
- , 

osophic jurists who broughtthe jurisprudence of Rome to its 
highest point of excellence, and as its rules so far as t ;:ey 
are concErned with private rights and relations, are based 
upon principles of justice and equity, it is also certain 
ths.t if this work of assimilation hs.d thus gone on, the com­
mon law of England would from an early day hs.ve been molded 
into the likeness of its original. Through the deciSions of 
its own courts the principles of justice and equity would 
everyWhere have been adopted. and would have appeared through 
out the entire structure. All this would have been aC00mp­
lished in the ordinary cause of development, by the ordinary 
common law tribunals, ' Ii thout any necessit9 for the creation 
of a separate court which should be charg~ w ith the special 
function of administering these pr'nciples of right, justice 
and equity. The grovvth o·f the Engl i sh law would have been 
identical in its external form with that of Rome; it would 
have proceeded in an orderly. unbroken manner through the 
instrumentality of the single specie of courts. and the pre­
sent do~ble nature of the national jurisprudence--the two 
great developments of "Law" and UEquity" would have been 
obviated. This result, however. was prevented by several 
patent causes which checked the progress of the law toward 
equity, narrowed its development into an arbitrary and rig­
id form, with little regard for abstract right, and made it 
necessary that a new jurisdiction should be erected to ad­
minister a separate sytem ~ore in accordance with natural 
justice and the rules of a Christian morality. These 
oauses we proceed to treat. 
The one which was perhaps. the source and explanation 
of all the others, consisted in the rigid character. extern­
al and internal. which the common law assumed after it began 
to be embodied in judicial precedents, and the unreasoning 
respect shown by the judges for these deCisions merely as 
precedents. There was, of course, a time before the char­
act ( r of the law as a lex scripta became well established. 
when this rigidity and inflexibility was not exhibited. The 
history of civilized jurisprudence CEn show nothing of the 
same kind comparable with the blink conservatism with which 
the common law judges were accustomed to regard rules and 
doctrines once formulated by precedent, and the stubborn re­
sistance which they interposed to any charge in the spirit 
or form of the law Which had been established. 
The frequent occurence of cases in which the rules of 
the law produced manifest injustice. and of cases where 
1 egal principles established by precedents could not apply It 
together wi th the unwillingness of the common 1 aw judges to 
allow any modification of doctrines already established 
through prior decisions, furnished the necessity as well as 
the occasion for another tribunal, Which was to adopt diff­
erent roethods. 
________________1 

When the same !ifficnlty of rigidity, arbitrariness. 
and non conformity to the needs of a growing society began 
first to be severely felt in the application of the law in 
Rome. the magi s trates supplied the remedy by means alre ~ dy 
at their disposal. The praetors constantly invented new 
actions and defenses, preserving in them, however~ a resem­
blance to the old; and in time they freed their jurisprud­
ence entirely from the restraints of ancient methods, and 
introduced the notion of aequitas by which the whole body of 
judicial legislation became in time reconstructed. The re­
markable feature is that this process of development was 
completed without any violent or sudden changes in existing 
judicial institutions. Thus the Roman law preserved its 
unity. The English common law judges set themselves. however. 
with an ironclad determination against the modification of 
doctrines and rules long established by precedent, against 
any relaxation of the settled methods which made the rights 
of suitors to depend upon the strictest observance of the 
most arbitrary and technical forms. This attitude of the 
English common law judges is not to be taken, however, as an 
indication that their conservatism was so absolute as to pre­
vent any impDovements or progress in the law. We attempt 
merely to indicate the general attitude during the period in 
which the court of chancery took its rise and for a consid­
erably long period thereafter. 
The improvement which an advancing civilization effect­
ed in the nat~on itself was to a partial extent reflected 
in the law. It is certa.1n. nevertheless, t bat the English 
common law was always far behind the progress of the English 
people, and in many instances retained the impress of its 
primitive barbarism. Parliamentary legislation occasionally 
interfered and affected a special reform; the principles of 
Equity reacted slightly upon the law; but still the common 
law judges as a b o~y manifested the blind conservatism we 
have attempted to describe down to comparatively modern times. 
At the risk of appearing presumptious, we are incline to as­
cribe that conservatism to the natural stubborness of the Eng­
lish mind and method of thought. 
Lo~d Mansfield was the first great English judge, cons­
ciously to adopt, and with systematic purpose t to effect the 
policy of the Roman praetors. He endeavored to give new 
life to the growth of the common law. and by means of equit­
able principles to reform it from within. Mansfield, however, 
has been accused of ignorance of the En:"lish law. To the 
oareful reader of history and to the student6f t~ansfield it 
will appear that despite the devastating affect of the IILet­
ters o:f,Junius~ Lord MaIlls field began the work which was la ter 
taken up by many of the able judges, who have graced the Eng­
lish bench within the present century, and by the State and 
national courts of the country. until the Common Law has now 
become a truly scientific and philosophical code. 
We have thus far attempted to analyse the causes exist­
ing in the early condition of the common law, and to show the 
attitude which rendered necessary a procedure capable of be­
ing adopted to a variety of circumstances, and of awarding 
a variety of special remedies. We now proceed to state the 
origin of this tribunal and the principal events connected 
with the establishment of its jurisdiction. 
Under the early Norman Kings, the Crown was aided by a 
Oouncil of Barons and high ecclesiastics which consisted of 
two branches--the General CounCil, which was occasionally 
called together. and was the historical predecessor of the 
Parliament, and a Special CounCil, very much smaller in nu.m­
ber, which was in constant attendance upon the King, and was 
the original of the )resent Privy Council. This Special 
Council aided the Crown in the exercise of its prerogative, 
which embraced a judicial function over matters that did not 
come within -the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. The 
extent of this judicial power of t he King. was from the nature 
of the country and its unsettled condition, very poorly de­
fined. I~ is probable also that this extraordinary juris­
diction of the King and council was not always exercised 
without 6omeopposition, especially when the matters in con­
troversy fell within the authority of the common law courts. 
Together with this extra- ordinary judicial function 
exercised by the King ·)r by the select Council trin his name 
and stead", there grewap the jarisdiction of the Chancellor. 
We aTe concerned with only those powers of his. which were 
judicial. Certain it is that he had an ordinary jarisdiction 
similar to that held by the common law courts. and independ­
ent of the extraordinary prerogative jarisdiction possessed 
by the King and Council, and afterwards delegated to the 
Chancellor himself. Pr6ceedings in causes arising before the 
Chancellor. under his ordinary jurisdiction were commenced 
by common law process and not by bill or petition; he could 
not summon a jury, but issues of fact in these prooeedings 
were sent for trial before the King's Bench. 
In addition to this ordinary fanction as a common law 
judge. the Chanoellor began to exercise the extraordinary 
jurisdiction--that of Grace--by delegation either from the 
King ot s el e c~ Council. It is probable that the judioial 
power of the Chancellor as a law judge. and his consequent 
familiarity with the laws of the realm and experienoe in 
adjudicating, were the reasons why, when any case oaIDe be­
fore the King. whioh f or any rec son could not be tried by t 
the Crown or Council. such case was referred to the Chan­
cellor for his sole deoision. Thus oommenced the extraord­
inary Equitable jurisdiotion of the Chanoellor. 
The practioe of delegating the CEsee to the Chancellor 
for his sole decision, grew rapidly until it became the acc­
epted mode of dealing with such controversies. It was a 
natural method and a necessary one. Gradually the Court of 
Chancery. a regular tribunal for administering Equitable 
relief and extraordinary remedies came definitely into exist­
ence. 
The delegation made by this order of the King conferred 
a general authority to give relief in all matters require­
ing the exercise of the prerogative of grace. This authority 
differed wholly from that upon which the jurisdiction of 
the law courts was based. -These latter tribunals acquired 
jurisdiction in each case which came before them by virtue 
of a delegation from the Crown. contained in the particular 
writ on which the case was founded. and a writ for that pur­
pose could only be issued in cases provided for by the pos­
itive rules of the Common Law. This was one of the fundam­
ensal distinctions between the jurisdiction of the English 
common law courts under their ancient organization. and that 
of the English Court of Chancery_ The 1rinciples upon Which 
tbe Chancellor was to base his decision in controversies 
coming within the extraordinary jurisdiction thus conferred 
upon him, were Homesty. Equity. and Conscience. The usual 
mode of instituting suits in Chancery became. that by bill 
or petition. wi tho :<_ t any writ issued on behalf of the plain­
tiff. 
Purposely avoiding the historical treatment of the grow­
th of Courts of Chancery. we shall examine the authority 
vested in them. These courts possessed and exercised the 
power, which belonged to no common law court, of ascertain­
ing the facts in contested cases by an examination of the 
oarties under oath ;--the "probing their consciences"--a meth­
od which gEve it an enormous advantage in the discovery of 
the truth, and which has only within our own times been ex­
tended to other tribunals. Again. the Chancellor was able to 
grant the remedy of prevention, which was wholly beyonF the 
capacity of the law courts. He seems to have used this kind 
of relief with great freedom, unrestrained by the rules which 
have since been settled with respect to the "injunction." 
As the business of the court increased and became regular 
and constant, the practice was established in the reign of 
Richard 11., of addressing the suitors bills or petitions 
directly to the Chancellor, and not to the King or his Coun­
cil. 
During the reigns of Henry IV and Henry V. t the Commons 
complained from time t o time that the Court of Chancery was 
usurping powers and invading the domain of the common law 
ju6ges. It is a very .emarkable fact. however, that this 
opposition never ~ent to the extent of denouncing the Equity 
jurisdiction as wholly unnecessary; it was always conueded 
that t ne law courts could furnish no adequate remedy for cer­
tain classes of wrongs, and that a separate tribunal was, 
therefore. necessary. As a result of these complaints, stat­
utes were passed which forbade the Chancellor from interfer­
- -, 
ing in a few ~3 pecified instances of legal cognizance t but 
did not abridge his general jurisdiction. In the reign of 
Edward IV., the Court of Chancery was in full operation; the 
mode of procedure by bill. filed by compla.inant, and a sub­
poena issued thereon to the de fendant, was settled; anJ the 
principles of its Equitable jurisdiction were ascertained and 
established upon the basis and with the limitations which 
have continued to the present time. No more opposition to 
the Court was made by the Commons although the law judges 
from time to time until as late as the reigh of James 1., 
still denied the power of the Chancellor to interfere with 
matters pending before their own courts, and especially dis­
puted his authority to restrain the proceedings in an action 
at law by means of his injunction. The controversy between 
the law and the Equity courts with respect to the line which 
separates their jurisdiction, has in fact never been complete­
ly settled; and perhaps it must necessarily continue until 
the two jurisdictions are blended into one. 
The court of Equity having existed as a separate tri­
bunal for so many centuries has at length disappeared in 
Great Britain and in most of the American States. The reform­
ing tendency of the present age is strongly toward an oblit­
eration of the lines which have hitherto divided the two 
jurisdictions. Thus in England and in most of the states of 
this country, the separate tribunals of law and of Equity 
have been abolished: the two jurisdiotions have been so far 
combined that both are administ Gred by the same court and 
judge; legal and equitable rights are enforced, and legal 
and equitable ~emedies are granted in one and the same act- · 
ion. The distinctions which hitherto existed between the 
two modes of procedure have been so far as possible abrog­
ated--one kind of action being established for all judicial 
controversies. In the national courts of the United States, 
and in most of the States, and two departments of law and 
equity are still maintained distinct in their rules, in their 
procedure and in their remedies. but the jurisdic tion to ad­
minister both systems is possessed and exercised by the same 
tr~bunal, which in one case acts as a court of law, and in 
the other as a court of Equity. 
In this manner we have attempted to pOint out the under­
lying causes It-,hich gave rise to the origin of Equity. This 
has involved a comparison of early Roman Law with the more 
rigid rules of t he ancient Common Law System. In conclusion 
let it again be remembered, that we have endeavored studious­
ly to avoid any semblance of an historical treatment of the 
Bubject. We have tried to be analytical. 
• 
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